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On July 6
th 2013, a train derailment
occurred in the small town of Lac-
Megantic, Quebec, Canada, causing a
major human and environmental disas-
ter. In this case study, we comprehen-
sively describe and analyze actions taken
by the Public Health Department of the
Eastern Townships, in close collabora-
tion with community-based organiza-
tions, during both the impact phase
emergency response and the post-impact
recovery operations that continued for
months. Due to the complexity of the
event, public health actions needed to be
broadly diversified. Preventive measures
targeted chemical, physical, biological,
and psychosocial hazards in the short-,
medium- and long-term. Our analyses
yielded valuable lessons that will improve
and inform our response to future events
while serving as a basis for developing a
conceptual framework for public health
emergency preparedness.
In the middle of the night of July 6,
2013, an unmanned Montreal Maine
and Atlantic Company oil train with no
engineer at the controls spontaneously
began rolling downhill from its night
stop location – on the main line near
Nantes - toward the town of Lac-
Megantic approximately 11 km away.
Lac-Megantic (population: 6,000 resi-
dents) is the seat of the Regional County
Municipality (RCM) of Le Granit, one
of 7 RCMs in the Eastern Townships
region of Quebec, Canada. The town of
Lac-Megantic is situated on the shores of
Lac-Megantic from which the commu-
nity derives its name. The lake forms the
historic center and the heart of Lac-
Megantic’s downtown and also serves as
the origin of the Chaudiere River that
flows through the town and then north-
ward for 175 km before emptying into
the St. Lawrence River (Fig. 1).
The train was in motion, powered by
gravity. Behind the 5 head-end locomo-
tives was a Locotrol equipment car, a
loaded boxcar, and 72 oil tank cars filled
with Bakken formation crude oil – 79
units in all. With a relatively constant
downhill slope between its initial location
and Lac-Megantic, the train’s descent
accelerated to almost 100 kph by the time
the locomotives encountered a sharp curve
in downtown Lac-Megantic and most of
the trailing cars derailed. The coupled
tank cars ended their trajectory, splayed
alongside the tracks in an accordion-like
manner, sandwiched against one another
(Fig. 2).
As they derailed, multiple tank cars
ruptured and escaping crude oil ignited,
leading to a succession of powerful explo-
sions and a raging conflagration. A dense
cloud of smoke rose above the flames and
the dark plume remained visible through-
out the night and the next day. The fire
spread rapidly to nearby structures,
destroying 40 homes and businesses, and
triggered a prolonged power outage. The
Lac-Megantic derailment and explosion
resulted in 47 deaths and necessitated the
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mass evacuation of 2,000 persons, equiva-
lent to one-third of the town’s population.
Environmental contamination was a
prominent feature in the post-disaster
landscape. Each tank car had the capacity
to haul 100,000 liters of light crude oil.
The perforated tank cars disgorged an esti-
mated 6 million liters of oil, much of
which caught fire and burned, or seeped
into the soil, but about 100,000 liters
spilled into the waters of the Megantic
lake and the Chaudiere River. As a com-
plicating feature, the area experienced a
heat wave in the days immediately follow-
ing the train crash, adding to the environ-
mental stressors experienced by the
response personnel.
Coupled with the human suffering and
the environmental degradation, the Lac-
Megantic derailment also caused serious
social and economic consequences. Many
citizens lost their jobs (temporarily or per-
manently) and many local businesses –
including some that had been spared
destruction – closed for months before
relocating elsewhere in town.
For public health professionals, one
question immediately became paramount:
How should the regional Public Health
Department respond to this tragedy? An
ongoing challenge for public health practi-
tioners is defining what it means to be pre-
pared and how to best anticipate and
respond during and after an acute event
that endangers the community’s collective
health, such as the Lac-Megantic train
derailment. This requires an emergency
preparedness and response framework.
Lesson 1: At the federal level, no public
health emergency preparedness framework
has identified essential elements applicable to
Canada. In Canada, in contrast to the
United States, public health addresses popu-
lation-level preparedness, distinct from clini-
cal care and health care facility
preparedness.1 There is an urgent need for a
national framework, applicable to the Cana-
dian context, to guide public heath actions
before, during, and after a disaster. Such a
framework could help local authorities better
handle challenges specific to major disasters
when response must be rapid and timely,
matched to the magnitude of the event, and
well-coordinated.
Despite the absence of a comprehensive
national framework, The Quebec Civil Pro-
tection Act aims to protect people and prop-
erty through risk reduction measures,
emergency response planning, response opera-
tions in actual disasters or situations of
imminent threat, and recovery operations.2
It is structured with different missions corre-
sponding to event-specific needs that allow
the necessary flexibility to adapt response to a
variety of types of disasters. Each mission falls
under a ministry or a government organiza-
tion with the appropriate expertise. Public
health is a component of the health mission,
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Health, and encompasses 4 core functions:
surveillance, health protection, disease pre-
vention, and health promotion.3
Emergency Response Operations
Phase: July – August, 2013
Given the impact of this extreme event
on the community’s population, the
involvement of public health personnel
and resources was critical throughout the
emergency response operations. The
regional Public Health Department
responded immediately, within the first
hours, to provide direct services that were
needed to protect the citizens of Lac-
Megantic and the on-site responders from
health hazards, including exposure to
chemical, physical, and biological agents
(Table 1).
This initial public health response was
provided within a particularly challenging
context. Operating in Lac-Megantic, a
long distance from the home office in
Sherbrooke, with a skeleton staff during
the peak summer vacation period, the
regional Public Health Department needed
to deliver a time-urgent response to a
Figure 1.Map of Lac-Megantic, Quebec, Canada.
Figure 2. Aerial photograph of the train derailment in downtown Lac-Megantic (July 6th 2013).
Source: Railway Investigation Report R13D0054. Transportation Safety Board of Canada.
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devastated community and facilitate close
coordination among involved partners,
while under constant and intensive mass-
media scrutiny.
Coordination of a multi-sectoral
response
In the first weeks, partners from
national, regional, and local levels con-
verged on the scene. Prominent partners
included municipal leaders; fire services
personnel; criminal investigators; coroners
and environmental services, health, and
social services professionals. The Ministry
of Civil Protection provided overarching
coordination. Each of the partners arrived
with different priorities and their diverse
skills needed to be melded in a manner
that facilitated timely and constructive
information sharing, decision-making,
and joint communications to public and
professional audiences. Within the realm
of public health, a variety of actors were
involved including the national Ministry of
Health, the national public health expertise
center (Institut National de Sante Publique
du Quebec), 2 regional Public Health
Departments, and the local health and social
services center. Together these partners
needed to craft a concerted response.
The public health emergency response
addressed several short-term health issues.
Our priority at that time was to assess and
control health risks associated with the
environmental impact. This obviously
necessitated identifying the chemical
products involved.
Lesson 2: Although the civil protection part-
ners immediately briefed public health profes-
sionals – verbally – about the contents of the
tank cars, it was very difficult to obtain accu-
rate, confirmatory documentation (documents
were withheld because they were considered as
evidence for the ongoing criminal investiga-
tion).With regard to the timely sharing of sensi-
tive information, agreement among key
partners should be settled prior to the occurrence
of future disasters.
Risk assessment of citizens, response
personnel, and the environment
Another challenge was the need to con-
duct simultaneous risk assessments for var-
ious populations of affected citizens
including Lac-Megantic residents who
were evacuated and reintegrated, Lac-
Megantic citizens who were exposed to
the cloud of smoke, and populations from
the municipalities along the oil-contami-
nated river. Concurrently, risk assessments
were performed for on-site responders and
clean-up personnel including firefighters,
police, decontamination team members,
railway specialists, and contractors.
A major focus of the risk assessment
was on a variety of potential hazardous
exposures including:
1) outdoor air contamination at the
derailment site and nearby;
2) indoor air contamination (especially
in basements) of evacuated residences;
3) drinking water contamination from
the municipal water system and pri-
vate wells;
4) recreational water contamination in
the lake (Lac-Megantic) and the
Chaudiere River;
5) soil contamination at the derailment
site and nearby;
6) contamination of surfaces located
under the toxic cloud.
Evacuation and reintegration
of Lac-Megantic citizens
Early in the morning of July 6, 2013,
about 1,000 residents whose residences
were close to the derailment site and the
intense fires were pre-emptively evacuated
by firefighters to create a large safety
perimeter. At 8:30 AM, initial air quality
samples were gathered from the disaster
site and surrounding area by a mobile lab-
oratory from the Ministry of Environment
and results were transmitted to the Public
Health Department around 10:00 AM.
Elevated concentrations of polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH), nitrogen
oxide, and total suspended particles (TSP)
were detected in the Fatima sector, down-
wind from the disaster site. This sector
had not been previously evacuated because
it was located outside the established fire
hazard perimeter (Fig. 1). However, due
to the detection of hazardous levels of con-
taminants, the Medical Health Officer
immediately requested the evacuation of
an additional 1,000 residents located in
the Fatima sector, including persons with
cognitive disorders living in a private
senior residence. Confirmatory laboratory
data received later in the day (e.g. total
PAH > 1,000 ng/m3) supported the
timely evacuation decision. Moreover, the
decision to evacuate proved to be espe-
cially appropriate because the fires contin-
ued to burn until July 8, 2015, 2 d later.
Lesson 3: No specific guideline values
have been specified for mixtures of com-
pounds like total PAH and TSP. A major
challenge faced by the Public Health Depart-
ment was to rapidly interpret the initial air
quality data and to request citizen evacua-
tion in the absence of available guidelines
regarding risk thresholds for mixtures of
multiple contaminants. A guide to safety
thresholds for a range of contaminants
should be created and available at all times
for public health physicians on duty.
The Public Health Department
describes the process of returning evacu-
ated citizens to their homes as
“reintegration.” Reintegration required
consensus among partners with the Public
Health Department playing a pivotal role
in assessing health risks, a key component
for ensuring citizen safety. The earliest
reintegration activities were initiated by
law enforcement without Public Health
Department involvement but this over-
sight was rapidly corrected. Thereafter,
the Public Health Department conducted
a health risk assessment, and provided
information and recommendations for
returning residents, prior to their reinte-
gration (Lesson 4). Sectors closest to the
“ground zero” derailment site required
more time prior to reintegration. In fact,
2 y following the derailment, access to one
heavily contaminated area continues to be
restricted for both residents and business
operators.
Lesson 4: Partners, including the Public
Health Department, need to collaborate
effectively during a disaster. Misunderstand-
ings regarding respective roles and responsi-
bilities may hamper operations. Ideally,
partner operations should be well coordi-
nated prior facing the challenges of a real
tragedy. This can be facilitated through joint
emergency preparedness planning and
exercising on an ongoing basis.
Epidemiological investigation
In the context of real or apparent
chemical, physical, or biological threats to
population health, the Public Health
Department initiated an epidemiological
116 Volume 2 Issue 3-4Disaster Health
investigation starting within the first week.
The investigation included case-finding
(“case declarations”) in area emergency
rooms and local medical clinics. Occupa-
tional health teams were mobilized in all
regions. All occupational safety and health
incidents affecting disaster workers, and
all potential hazardous exposures for resi-
dents of Lac-Megantic or surrounding
municipalities, were rapidly reported to
the Public Health Department using a
declaration form. One dozen cases of pos-
sible exposure to chemical contaminants
were reported, with the majority of these
cases occurring in responders. There were
no severe cases. Presenting symptoms
included headache, weakness, difficulty
breathing, and eye irritation. Symptoms
could be traced to accidental inhalation of
oil fumes (5 cases), accidental projection
of liquid (3 cases), and exhaustion
(4 cases).
Risk communication
Risk communication, based on the
Quebec risk management framework,4,5
was a key component of the public
health emergency response. Multiple
factors were found to increase perceived
risk for health consequences on the part
of citizens of Lac-Megantic6,7 Risk per-
ception was related to the nature of
event and the degree of exposure to
hazardous materials. The event com-
bined the elements of a runaway train
derailment in a downtown area that
precipitated a cascade of explosions and
a massive fire of extreme intensity that
required 2 d to extinguish, combined
with hazardous materials contamination
of air, water, and soil.
This train crash was appropriately charac-
terized as human-generated, involuntary,
uncontrollable, unpredictable, and unfamil-
iar. Moreover, the incident appeared to pro-
duce an inequitable distribution of risks and
benefits. Citizens expressed understandable
suspicion and distrust of institutions (gov-
ernment, railway system). The degree of
media attention was both overwhelming and
distressing. Perceived risk was also related to
the dramatic and fear-provoking impact
phase, the violent of loss of life, and the
enduring health effects. The event was cata-
strophic, with both identifiable and unrecov-
ered victims, premature death of young
citizens, severe and sometimes irreversible
injuries, population exposure to hazardous
materials, and potential, though poorly
defined, health risks for future generations.
Risk communications employed several
channels to reach the general public and
the disaster workers. Press conferences
were conducted every day, beginning on
the first day. This daily briefing was sup-
plemented with timely press releases,
expert media interviews, and informa-
tional meetings for both citizens and disas-
ter workers. A handout was developed on
occupational safety and health for disaster
workers. A second handout, available in
both print and online formats, provided
guidance for citizen reintegration follow-
ing protective evacuation. Upon review it
was determined that this handout was
somewhat difficult to read for people with
low literacy skills,8 a relevant issue in the
Granit RCM where the educational
attainment level for half of adults
(51.2%), ages 25–64, is a high-school
diploma or less.9,10 Another lesson learned
focused on the competing demands for
communicating to the local population
during a disaster of national significance
and international publicity. For the first
2 days, the Public Health Department
experienced intense media pressure from
journalists and networks from throughout
the nation and around the globe that con-
verged on Lac-Megantic to cover the
story. Dozens of press conferences were
convened but local communications suf-
fered as a result. Thereafter the Public
Health Department consciously shifted its
media strategy to prioritize communica-
tions directed toward affected citizens
using local radio and direct outreach.
Lesson 5: The most affected residents did
not have access to television or Internet
because of the power outage and the evacua-
tion of one-third of the population from their
homes. Local radio, person-to-person com-
munications, and door-to-door distribution
of printed informational materials were
judged to be more effective for information
sharing to affected citizens than regional or
national media. The Public Health Depart-
ment must maintain expertise and skills in
crisis communication and should prepare
event-specific written documents for the gen-
eral population in advance and during a
disaster,
The Recovery Operations Phase:
September 2013 – present
Disaster recovery subsumes the overall
decisions and actions taken following a
disaster to restore the social, economic,
physical, and environmental conditions of
the community and to decrease future
disaster risks.11 The operational domain
of Public Health extends beyond health
protection to also include health promo-
tion and prevention of diseases, psychoso-
cial problems, and injuries; therefore, the
participation of the Public Health Depart-
ment is integral throughout the recovery
operations phase (Table 2).
Health surveillance
The Public Health Department has
implemented a local surveillance system
focusing on health issues related to the
train derailment to keep track of potential
after-effects of the tragedy (Fig. 3).
Creation of the surveillance system
required the thoughtful selection of a set
of indicators ranging from health deter-
minants to disaster consequences. These
indicators operate on different timescales
(short term, medium term, long term)
and include data that are compiled
monthly (e.g., environmental monitoring,
volume of new requests for psychological
support), annually (e.g. hospital morbid-
ity), and over a multi-year period of
observation (e.g., incidence of cancer).
The surveillance system draws upon
available information from the health
care network (e.g. medical/administrative
information systems, calls to health hot-
lines, reportable disease notifications,
absenteeism/sickness reports within the
health care network, ambulance trans-
ports) and databases located within part-
ner organizations (e.g., air quality, soil
characterization, drinking water analyses,
crime and road accident data, workers’
compensation). Four health update bulle-
tins were produced and published during
the recovery period. Each bulletin pre-
sented information categorized into 4
topic areas (news, psychological health,
environment, physical health). The bulle-
tins were disseminated throughout the
health care network and distributed to
local and government partners involved
in the recovery.
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With the collaboration of researchers in
the field of psychosocial recovery, the Pub-
lic Health Department conducted a study
entitled “Enque^te de sante populationnelle
estrienne” in summer 2014, one year fol-
lowing the tragedy, using a representative
population-based sample of 8,737 adults
in the Eastern Townships (including 811
respondents from the Granit RCM).
Participants completed a telephone or
web-based questionnaire with a relatively
good response rate (48%). Three types of
exposure were measured: 1) human losses
(e.g., loss of loved one, perceived threat to
life for self or loved one, physical injury),
2) material losses (e.g., evacuation, home
damage, job loss), and 3) self-reported
negative perceptions of the train derail-
ment (e.g., stressful event, interruption of
important life events, adverse effects on
the future, significant losses). Exposure
was then categorized as intense (e.g., all
three exposure types were endorsed),
moderate (e.g., one or 2 exposure types
were endorsed), or no exposure.
Among citizens comprising the Granit
population, we observed that two-thirds
(64%) of participants suffered human
losses, 23% suffered material losses, and
54% held negative perceptions of the
event. One-in-six Granit participants
(17%) experienced “intense exposure”
while one-in-four (25%) had “no
exposure.” Community strengths were
observed in Granit, including a strong
sense of belonging, access to medical and
psychosocial resources (at higher rates
than elsewhere in the Eastern Townships),
and a sustained high level of resilience -
comparable to elsewhere in the region.
However, important differences were
observed according to exposure intensity.
Self-reported depressive episode over the
past year was twice as frequent in intensely
exposed adults in Granit compared to
those with no exposure (Fig. 4). Anxiety
disorders, alcohol abuse (1 episode/
week), and consumption of anxiolytic
medications were more frequent among
Table 2. Public health actions in the months following the Lac-Megantic train derailment
Component of recovery Brief description of actions
Coordination Regular discussions with local partners (e.g. health care network, municipality) and interdisciplinary government
partners (e.g., environment and municipal affairs).
Health surveillance Surveillance system based on set of several health indicators to keep track of the potential after-effects of the tragedy.
Health diagnosis was sent to partners quarterly.
Research Random survey among 811 adults in Granit, one year following the tragedy, examining prevalence of health and
psychological issues according to the level of exposure to the tragedy (in terms of human losses, material losses, and
negative perceptions). A similar survey with an improved version of the questionnaire will be conducted in 2015, i.e.
2 y after the tragedy.
Collaboration to a mixed methods study (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Grant, 2015–2020) that will
provide in-depth exploration of the consequences of such disasters and ways to enhance the well-being of survivors
and the affected community. This study aims to better understand the recovery process and factors positively or
negatively associated with personal and community resilience for people exposed to disaster stressors.
Community development Support of local leaders and partners.
Mentoring and sharing expertise to promote local initiatives, stimulate the redevelopment of the community, and
promote resilience in the wake of the train derailment.
Occupational health Both the physical health and psychological health of workers were considered. In the first month after the event, more
than 24 of 39 (62%) of the workers compensation claims related to the train derailment involved psychological
injuries. Workplace psychosocial interventions targeted 3 components: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), suicide
prevention, and psychosocial risks/organizational factors.
Environmental health Continuous interpretation of the results of analyses performed at different locations along the water distribution
system, at municipal wells, and at 3 fixed sampling air stations at different sites in the town. No risks to health related
to drinking water or outdoor air have been identified.
Attempting to “measure” perceived risks, through:
 observations during meetings with the public
 close relations with the local recovery team
 an ongoing survey project involving interviews with 60 persons from the population of Lac-Megantic and the MRC
du Granit focusing on the concerns, opinions, and requests of these citizens related to risks and risk management
Health impact assessment Evaluation of the impacts on health linked to the reconstruction of the downtown area, with special focus on where to
locate the railroad corridor. Main issues examined: job creation, local economic development, noise and vibration,
medical trauma risks, anxiety and psychological distress and trauma, derailment risks and environmental
contamination
Figure 3. Health surveillance in the recovery phase: Conceptual framework.
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those who were intensely exposed (13%,
17%, 20%, respectively) compared to
those with no exposure (4%, 4%, 9%,
respectively). Use of psychosocial services
was also found to be 4 times more fre-
quent among intensely exposed persons
(31%) relative to non-exposed persons
(7%). These findings, consistent with the
current scientific knowledge,12 suggest
that the population of Granit has suffered
psychologically and still does.
Indeed, most studies have found signifi-
cant differences between persons who are
exposed to a catastrophic disaster and those
who are not, and the accumulation of
losses and disruptive events increases the
risk of developing health problems.13-16
The psychological consequences of disas-
ters can persist over time, particularly
when there is insufficient social support
from the family members or friends, and
also when governmental or community
assistance is delayed or lacking.17-19 These
findings underscore the importance of pro-
moting and protecting population health.
It is noteworthy that the survey results
were rapidly shared with community and
regional partners involved in the response,
and with the general public, through a
press conference and media interviews.
Several weeks following the media broad-
casts, a decision was made to secure fund-
ing to support psychosocial recovery in
Lac-Megantic.
Lesson 6: People should never underesti-
mate the long-term impacts of a tragedy,
especially on mental health and psychological
well-being. To ensure that this major issue is
not overlooked, the Public Health Depart-
ment should quickly implement a monitor-
ing system based on a set of easily available
indicators of psychological health and func-
tioning and, in the ideal world, conduct a
survey to capture data that are really popula-
tion-based.
Environmental health (the case of
asbestos)
Due to the crude oil saturation from
the leaking tank cars, contaminated soil
from the train crash site, and from areas
destroyed or severely damaged by the fires,
was excavated and transported to a tempo-
rary treatment center during Fall, 2013.
When asbestos was found in soil samples,
the excavation/transport operations were
suspended while multiple agencies
(Departments of Public Health, Environ-
ment, Occupational and Health Safety,
Municipal Affairs) conducted a thorough
risk assessment of both soil and airborne
exposures to asbestos for the onsite work-
ers and also for residents living near the
crash site. The Public Health Department
determined that the risks for the general
public and for onsite workers (who had
been wearing respiratory protective equip-
ment) were very low. The Public Health
Department recommended implementa-
tion of an air quality surveillance system
at the train crash site, nearby areas, and
soil treatment centers, and preventive
measures specific for asbestos for onsite
workers if warranted based on the results
of the soil analyses.
Lesson 7: The Public Health Depart-
ment and response partners made a public
presentation describing the results of the
risk assessment for general public citizens
and onsite workers potentially exposed to
asbestos in air or soil. Meeting attendees
and media indicated their confidence in
the veracity of the assessment, showing low
or minimal risk, as reported by the Public
Health Department. This underscores that,
for the sake of transparency, complete and
accurate relevant information should be
disclosed as far as possible.
Concluding Comments
Our comprehensive analysis of the pub-
lic health emergency response and recovery
operations over the past 2 y in Lac-
Megantic illustrates the broad spectrum of
public health actions required for ensuring
that the medical, psychological, and envi-
ronmental impacts of such a disaster are
minimized. The analysis also presents a
series of lessons that should be taken into
account for future public health emergency
events. Most of these lessons can be gener-
alized to a spectrum of incidents including
emerging infectious diseases, chemical
spills, terrorist attacks, and natural disas-
ters, events that pose both immediate and
ongoing threats to population health and
well-being.
Our work contributes to the develop-
ment of a conceptual framework for pub-
lic health emergency preparedness that
clearly identifies the essential elements of
emergency and recovery operations during
all-hazards emergencies. Our framework is
particularly relevant within the context of
the Canadian public health system. It is
also essential to continue research in this
area to identify the different social and
community factors related to the resilience
of individuals and communities.
To conclude, this unique experience
demonstrates the need for the Public
Health Department to establish bonds of
cooperation with the various organizations
in the community, in a manner that is
respectful of each other’s mandates, in
order to be ready to intervene at any time
in the case of emergencies. However, pub-
lic health actions continue long after
emergency response operations have con-
cluded, particularly because of the pro-
tracted duration of 1) disaster-related
psychological consequences,20 2) some
types of medical complications including
disabling injury and risks for future dis-
ease, and 3) environmental impact. In the
case of the Lac-Megantic train derailment,
Figure 4. Prevalence of self-reported depressive episode in the past 12 months according to
exposure intensity, random sample of 8,737 adults in Eastern Townships, including 811 adults in
the Granit RCM, summer 2014.
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